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Abstract
The METI risk problem refers to the uncertain outcome of sending transmissions into space
with the intention of messaging to extraterrestrial intelligence (METI). Here, I demonstrate
that this uncertainty is undecidable by proving that that the METI risk problem reduces to
the halting problem. This implies that any proposed moratorium on METI activities cannot
be based solely on the requirement for new information. I discuss three policy resolutions
to deal with this risk ambiguity. Precautionary malevolence assumes that contact with ETI
is likely to cause net harm to humanity, which remains consistent with the call for a METI
moratorium, while assumed benevolence states that METI is likely to yield net benefits to
humanity. I also propose a policy of preliminary neutrality, which suggests that humanity
should engage in both SETI (searching for extraterrestrial intelligence) and METI until ei-
ther one achieves its first success.
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1 Introduction: The METI risk problem
Could sending messages into space be dangerous? A recent exchange between Buchanan
(2016) and Vakoch (2016) in the journal Nature Physics highlights the ongoing debate as to
whether or not messaging to extraterrestrial intelligence (METI) with electromagnetic waves
constitutes an existential risk to humanity. The potential risk associated with METI has led
some researchers to consider the possibility of a moratorium on METI activities (Shuch &
Almár, 2007; Billingham & Bedford, 2011). Other analyses suggest that METI could cause
either positive or negative consequences through unknown factors that we cannot influence
(Penny 2012), while any attempts at concealing our civilization’s leakage radiation would
be prohibitively burdensome (Shostak 2013).
I define the METI risk problem as the question: would contact with extraterrestrial
intelligence (ETI) cause net benefits or net harm for humanity? Because engaging in METI
could possibly attract additional attention from ETI (in addition to existing radio signals,
biosignatures, and city lights), this question is also directly relevant for determining the
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value of engaging in METI. Following Haqq-Misra et al. (2013), the value of engaging in
METI, UM , can be expressed in terms of the probability of detection by ETI, pd, and the
expected value of the magnitude of ETI response, 〈M〉, as:
UM = pd 〈M〉 − C. (1)
In Eq. (1), C represents the total financial costs of engaging in METI, while the term
pd 〈M〉 represents the total value (positive or negative) realized from actually conducting
METI. The heart of the METI risk problem is the sign of 〈M〉; we cannot readily predict
whether 〈M〉 should be positive or negative. This leads to fundamental disagreements
regarding whether or not to engage in METI, as we cannot know if contact with ETI would
be beneficial (〈M〉 ≥ 0⇒ UM ≥ 0) or harmful (〈M〉 < 0⇒ UM < 0) to humanity.
This paper demonstrates that the METI risk problem is fundamentally undecidable,
which suggests three policy options for how to proceed (or not proceed) with METI. Each
of these policy options would determine the long-term detectability of Earth’s radio spec-
trum to any extraterrestrial watchers. Likewise, the same policy options should apply to
any extraterrestrial civilizations also facing the METI risk problem, which underscores the
connection between METI policy and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI).
2 Proof of undecidability
Can the METI risk problem be resolved? Penny (2012) argues that METI could be beneficial
or harmful on an existential level, with no ability to distinguish between this range of
options until the actual detection of ETI. This line of reasoning suggests that any policies
for METI today, such as a METI moratorium, cannot be based upon the requirement for
new information.
In this section, I provide a formal demonstration of the argument advanced by Penny
(2012). The purpose of this demonstration is to highlight a key feature of the METI risk
debate that is sometimes neglected; namely, that the only information that could resolve
the METI risk problem is the actual detection of ETI. In particular, I construct a proof by
reduction to show that the METI risk problem is undecidable. (Readers who are convinced
of this statement, or find it trivial, can skip to the next section.) A decision problem
is undecidable if it is impossible to construct an algorithm (or Turing machine) that can
provide a yes or no answer to every question in the domain of the problem. I accomplish
this proof by demonstrating that the METI risk problem reduces to a known undecidable
problem; namely, the halting problem.
The halting problem is a classic decision problem that can be expressed as follows: given
an arbitrary Turing machine Thalt, can we determine (with a yes or no answer) if Thalt
will halt when initialized with input w? In other words, the halting problem asks whether
or not it is possible to determine in advance if a computer program will halt or continue
running forever. The halting problem was proved to be undecidable by Alan Turing in 1936,
which implies that any computable function that can be reduced to the halting problem is
therefore also undecidable.
To begin the proof, I first assume that there exists a decidable Turing machine TMETI
that answers the METI risk problem when given a set of observations w. (Note that w
represents any general set of information, including astronomical observations, sociological
deductions, and risk analysis. TMETI represents any possible deductive means of using w
to arrive at an answer to the METI risk problem.) I construct TMETI as a finite-state
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machine with three possible states: q0 (initial state, 〈M〉 is unknown), q1 (〈M〉 ≥ 0), and
q2 (〈M〉 < 0). When given input w, TMETI will either remain at q0, transition to state q1,
or transition to state q2. TMETI answers yes if state q1is reached and answers no if state
q2 is reached. Likewise, if TMETI remains in state q0, then this implies that input w is
insufficient to reach a decision.
I next define a Turing machine T
′
METI
that takes w and TMETI as input. I construct
T
′
METI
so that T
′
METI
will transition to state q and halt if and only if TMETI enters state
q1 or q2 with input w. This implies that T
′
METI
will halt if and only if TMETI answers yes
or no. I have now reduced the resolution of the METI risk problem TMETI to the question
of whether or not T
′
METI
will halt with input w. This is identical to the halting problem
(i.e., determining if Thalt will halt with input w). However, I assumed at the start of this
proof that TMETI is decidable, but I have reduced TMETI to the undecidable problem Thalt.
Therefore, I have arrived at a contradiction and must conclude that TMETI is undecidable.
3 Policy options
If the METI risk problem is undecidable, then how should we as a civilization decide whether
or not to engage in METI? No information, prior to the actual discovery of ETI, can provide
an unambiguous prediction of benefits or harm from ETI contact. In order to make any
progress on this question, we must therefore make assumptions about the terms in Eq. (1).
3.1 Precautionary Malevolence
One approach, adopted by many critics of METI, is that of precautionary malevolence.
Lacking any means of deciding the METI risk problem, a policy of precautionary malevolence
makes the assumption that 〈M〉 < 0 ⇒ UM < 0, which implies that we should not engage
in METI. Arguments in favor of this policy include the recognition that primitive human
societies on Earth tend to collapse, at least culturally, when directly contacted by our modern
technological civilization (Diamond, 1999). Given the magnitude of possible risks, so the
argument goes, we should refrain from engaging in METI, or at least give careful thought
to the information content of any messages, in order to avoid increasing any risk from ETI
contact to our own civilization (Barkow 2014).
One version of a policy of precautionary malevolence is the proposal to enact a world-
wide METI moratorium until the METI risk problem can be resolved (Shuch & Almár,
2007; Billingham & Bedford, 2011). However, I have shown above that the METI risk prob-
lem is undecidable, so no new information (apart from the actual discovery of ETI) can
resolve this issue. Thus, a METI moratorium cannot be justified on the basis of a learning-
before-doing decision principle, because no amount of exploration or research can resolve
an undecidable problem. Korbitz (2014) has similarly discussed the limited applicability
of the precautionary principle to defend a METI moratorium. The only possible learning
that could resolve this ambiguity is if SETI actually succeeds in discovering a signal from
ETI—in which case the decision to lift the moratorium would become a matter of debate.
Thus, a METI moratorium on the basis of learning-before-doing would effectively prohibit
METI activities entirely until SETI first succeeds.
A modified version of precautionary malevolence is the idea that we should wait until
we are “more evolved” as a species before we think about engaging in METI. This position
presumes that human civilization currently lacks the moral capacity to engage in contact
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with ETI, but future humans (or transhumans) may evolve greater sensibilities than we
know now. This version of precautionary malevolence would even suggest that we should
refrain from engaging in METI even if SETI succeeds—instead, we should wait until a more
distant time in the future when we have evolved as a species. Although I cannot predict
the future of human ethics, I will assume that any criterion based upon human evolution
must require at least hundreds to thousands of years of civilizational development in order
for culture and biology to significantly change from today. If this is the case, and if we
assume a policy of precautionary malevolence, then it becomes fair to ask the question: why
engage in SETI at all? If we have no plans of replying at all until a distant and unspecified
point in the future, then why even bother searching? If human ethics is the limiting factor,
then perhaps we should abandon both SETI and METI and focus instead on improving our
civilizational values.
3.2 Assumed Benevolence
Another approach, adopted by many advocates of METI, is that of assumed benevolence.
Lacking any means of deciding the METI risk problem, a policy of assumed benevolence
makes the assumption that 〈M〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ UM > 0, which implies that we should consider
engaging in METI now. The primary argument in favor of this policy is that any advanced
ETI should already have detected our technological civilization, regardless of whether or not
we engage in METI. In addition to the radio leakage that has been emanating from Earth
for nearly one hundred years (Scheffer, 2004), other tell-tale signs of intelligent life on Earth
include our city lights (Loeb & Turner, 2012) and the spectral signature of our atmosphere
(Schneider et al., 2010). Any possible harm that ETI could cause us, so the argument goes,
should have already occurred, so we need not worry about any catastrophic threats that
could result fromMETI. Furthermore, the mere discovery of ETI is presumed to be beneficial
(if only for scientific and philosophical purposes), which leads toward the conclusion that any
success that arises from METI would provide net benefits. Some optimists further imagine
that contact with ETI could initiate an interstellar conversation that would bestow us with
advanced knowledge (e.g., Sagan 1973) or even welcome us into a galactic club (Bracewell,
1976), bringing about tremendous benefits that would otherwise have been impossible.
A particular version of assumed benevolence examines the possibility of technological
asymmetry between us and ETI (Vakoch, 2011). Any ETI that we might contact will
invariably be more advanced than us (see, e.g., Baum et al., 2011), which suggests that
we might make more widespread use of radio technology than them. By this argument,
SETI may never succeed because advanced ETI neither transmit unintentional leakage nor
intentional transmissions in our direction. This technological asymmetry suggests that the
burden of transmission falls upon the younger, less advanced, civilization. Given that ETI
should already know about our existence, our current technological position may place us
in an ideal situation to initiate contact with nearby, non-malevolent, ETI.
A policy of assumed benevolence suggests that METI should be beneficial in general,
so we should start thinking about actively transmitting for METI as we continue passively
exploring through SETI observations. However, assumed benevolence does not necessarily
suggest that we should transmit at all costs; METI is expensive, after all, and the costs
of engaging in METI must be weighed against the (unknown) magnitude of benefits that
would arise from contact with ETI (i.e., does pd 〈M〉 ≥ C in Eq. (1)?). A policy of assumed
benevolence is inconsistent with the idea of a METI moratorium, although this policy also
does not necessarily imply that we must start transmitting today. For example, the cost
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of METI will decrease significantly in the coming decades when missions such as TESS,
PLATO, and JWST begin to characterize nearby exoplanets, which will provide a much
better target list for both SETI and METI.
3.3 Preliminary Neutrality
A third approach to the METI risk problem is a policy of preliminary neutrality. Lacking
any means of deciding the METI risk problem, a policy of preliminary neutrality makes
the assumption that 〈M〉 = 0 ⇒ UM = −C. This policy is takes no position on the likely
behavior, social structure, or technological capabilities of ETI. This implies that there is no
significant reason to engage in METI, while the only reason to oppose METI is based upon
cost limitations. Evidence for preliminary neutrality include the lack of response by ETI to
the handful of METI attempts that could have succeeded by now.
The policy of preliminary neutrality implies that the value of METI is simply the cost
of transmitting. This policy can be used to argue in favor of prioritizing relevant public
resources for other purposes, such as SETI or exoplanet characterization. However, this
policy is also consistent with the desires of individuals, private corporations, and wealthy
sponsors to engage in METI at their own expense (for whom C is an acceptable sunk cost).
Preliminary neutrality remains inconsistent with the idea of a METI moratorium, al-
though it cannot make a strong argument for the prioritization of METI. Under a policy of
preliminary neutrality, activities that could potentially lead to the discovery of ETI—such
as any SETI or METI programs, and possibly exoplanet characterization—should continue
unabated as funding and enthusiasm permit until the actual discovery of ETI. Once this
discovery occurs, all METI programs should be suspended immediately to allow for global
discussion of this unprecedented result. Preliminary neutrality recognizes the possibility
that speculative endeavors like METI and SETI are probably unlikely to succeed, so there
is no reason to prohibit either of these activities until direct evidence shows otherwise.
4 Conclusion: Implications for detectability
I have demonstrated that the METI risk problem is undecidable. That is, the question
“would contact with ETI cause net benefits or net harm for humanity?” cannot be unam-
biguously resolved prior to the actual detection of ETI. Based on this proof, three major
policy options remain:
1. Precautionary malevolence: contact with ETI is likely to cause net harm to humanity,
so we should not engage in METI until SETI succeeds.
2. Assumed benevolence: contact with ETI is likely to yield net benefits to humanity, so
we should begin engaging in cost-effective METI along with SETI.
3. Preliminary neutrality: contact with ETI is unlikely to occur, so we may as well
continue with SETI and METI until one of them succeeds.
Precautionary malevolence, particularly if it leads to a METI moratorium, would decrease
Earth’s long-term detectability in order to mitigate potential risk. An extreme form of
such a moratorium would consider not just radio transmissions, but also optical evidence
of civilization and even the presence of spectral technosignatures in Earth’s atmosphere.
Such a policy would decrease the likelihood of Earth’s detection by ETI astronomers, and
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may also correlate to a decreased probability of success for SETI. Under an active policy of
precautionary malevolence, future Earth would be intentionally much less detectable than
Earth today.
Assumed benevolence encourages engagement in METI today as a supplement to SETI,
which would increase the overall strength of radio (and perhaps optical) transmissions from
Earth. Most METI attempts today target individual star systems, particularly those sus-
pected to harbor habitable planets, which can increase Earth’s detectability in the direction
of transmission. Under a policy of assumed benevolence, future Earth would be intentionally
more detectable than Earth today, although such an increase would not be uniform in all
directions or across all wavelengths.
Preliminary neutrality acknowledges that SETI and METI are both unlikely to succeed.
Human civilization faces a wide range of catastrophic and existential threats, none of which
require intervention by ETI, so resources should be prioritized toward ensuring a long-term
sustainable future. Under a policy of preliminary neutrality, the detectability of future
Earth would remain approximately the same as today. METI, as well as SETI, would
remain viable under preliminary neutrality, with scales limited only by the availability of
resources. Preliminary neutrality acknowledges that SETI and METI are both extremely
low-probability gambles, but the success of either one would lead to a transformational
jackpot.
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